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Fichte spoke from deUberate conviction

when

variously declared that the kind of philosophy one chooses

depends upon the kind of person one is.
To him it seemed
that, basically, there are two types of men, and two alone.
This led

him to substitute for the threefold classification of philosophies
advanced by Kant, a dual division. Whereas his predecessor had
differentiated dogmatic, skeptical and critical philosophies, Fichte
insisted that every philosophical system is dominated either by an
insistence upon human freedom or by the thesis of universal determinism. Given a man who exhibits intellectual spontaneity and
is aware thereof,
and who possesses conscious aims which he
ardently pursues in the face of physical and mental lethargv and of
environmental oppositions; given a

man who is genuinely
who sifts data for

conscious, self-directing and self-critical,

self-

their

who
who is

truth value and reaches out in intellectual exploration, and

passes judgment upon himself and his world; given a self

and we have a person who is incommitted to a metaphysics and a social philosophy of
freedom. Such a person can understand why the one of the contrary type holds to the view he does. He can understand why one
who has never with freedom acquired selfhood and spontaneitv, and
who consequentl}' identifies himself with substances and things,
inevitably maintains what Fichte variously characterized as a substantive, a materialistic, and a deterministic world-view.
But as to
the error of this view the self-consciously free spirit is as fully
convinced as he is luminously aware of its causes.
These contentions of Fichte obviously grow out of an interpretation of the self that is essentially individualistic, and the present
truly in possession of himself,

vincibly

writer, for one, finds

much

523

PHILOSOPHY

INDIAN"

of value in them.

They

should, however,

not obscure the fact that for certain purposes it may be more
It
significant to trace differences in world-views along other lines.

may

not be gainsaid that philosoph}- in general

feeds upon the

and reckons with the numerous areas of experience organized through the operation of practical and theoretical
Man, for example, requires food, shelter, and safety, and
interests.
these he must win through practical adjustments to and through
manipulation of his environment. The most advanced as well as the
concrete facts of

life,

most primitive thus possess habits, aptitudes, systems of practices
and bodies of ideas that constitute an important sector of life.
This sector

is

social in the sense that

it

has acquired

its

character

which the individual has co-operated with his
fellows, and through the pressure of traditions and norms sustained
by the group. As moulded by the features of the real world in which
through

life is

activities in

carried on,

practices,

it

of imagination that
ities

may

from myths,

of the

is

be differentiated from a set of ideas and
and taboos, which arise from the play

tales

largely uncontrolled by the stubborn actual-

existing environment,

and that assume organization

through the forces of fear and other emotions of thwarted and
Still again, in
half-formed desires, of hopes and present needs.
the history of
activities, a

experience

human

body of

culture there gradually emerge a variety of

ideas,

and a characteristic outlook

— that we have come

to call aesthetic.

—a

be demarcated from sets of interest that are theoretic and
or

more

stricth'

social

and

ethical,

sector of

This, in turn,

or essentially

may

scientific,

and

religious

cosmic.

Xow

philosoph}'

experience.

It

may

becomes

not safely neglect an\- phase of
significant

in

human

proportion to the compre-

hensiveness, as well, of course, as to the success with which

it

in-

and synthesizes the facts, and more particularly the organinterests
and categories, of all the departments of individualizing
But philosophers, like other people, see
social life and thought.
As a matter of fact, their conclusions
in
part.
and achieve only
influence now of this and again
predominating
take shape under the
According to the latter,
of another field of concrete experience.
therefore, and to the range and degree of the organization of the
terprets

facts that fall therein, will be the resultant world-view, or at least

certain important features of this view that enable us significantly
to

compare and

to contrast

it

with rival doctrines.

Among

different
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peoples,

and

and

however, different areas of

at different epochs,

interest

have tended

to exercise the

extent that this has occurred,

we

are apt to

and

drifts in those systems of ideals

dominant

role.

hnd more or

facts that

activit\

To

the

less general

comprise the world-

view.

we keep

If

mind these facts, an
revealed when we compare,
in

interesting and a significant

is
in a very large and general
way, the contemporary thought currents of the West, and particularly of America, with the outlook which is often broadl)' char-

contrast

acterized as Indian.

and

The former,

it

becomes

clear,

have their

basis,

unique degree, in the experiences of practical and ethical

to a

activity,

and

life

find their logical orientation primarily in science,

more

specifically in the natural

hand,

is

sciences

;

the latter, on the other

peculiarly dominated by features of the religious conscious-

As

might be pointed out that in so far
all beyond the
technical consideration of particular problems to broad metaphysical
construction, or to a comprehensive social philosophy, it in the main
ness.

as our

a confirmatory fact,

own

it

present American philosophy ventures at

does so without

first

consulting the deliverances of the specificall\-

religious consciousness.

Even

philosophical interpretations of re-

measure based upon metaphysical conclusions
derived from sources which, however extensive, fail to include the
ligion are in a large

facts of religious experience or the generalizations reached through

That reand expressions represent facts, and that the comparative, historical, sociological and psychological treatments of
them offer considerations, no less significant for the larger tasks
of philosophy than other facts and other methodically reached considerations, seems to be c|uite disregarded by perhaps even the
majority of our \\'estern thinkers. In the case of India, on the other
hand, the articulation of philosophy and religion seems so close at
times as to defy any clear separation of the two. Religion, it would
seem, has continued to be perhaps the chief cultural influence, and
the primary source of the content as well as the inspiration of
a comparative, historical or psychological study of them.

ligious attitudes

its debt by transforming
by purging and yet confirming, the pivotal
Garbe has even conaffirmations of the religious consciousness.
tended, with respect to India, that "not only has the most absolute

philosophy, while the latter has discharged

and yet

sustaining,

freedom of thought always prevailed, but also philosophical speculaeven in its boldest forms, has placed itself in accord w'ith the

tion,
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popular religion to an extent never ai,Min realized on earth between
these two powers.
"•

The
tion of

contrast thus alleged

demands

elaboration, and the affirma-

existence requires defense.

its

because the allegation

is

made

in the

Especially

is

this the

case

face of a i)enetrating studv

which Professor Radhakrishnan has recently published under the
title. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy.
In this
volume, Professor Radhakrishnan deals with the pluralistic s} stems
lately current in Western philosophw
lie points out the \va\- in
which they diverge from what he considers to be the natural conclusion of sound, impartial philosophizing, namel\-, monistic idealism.

These deviations he then ascribes

to

what he

calls the

"reign of re-

ligion" but characterizes as "the interference of religious prejudice."

might thus >eem that Professor Radhakrishnan finds religion
we have just declared it to pla\- a relatively

It

potent precisely where

subordinate part

;

and

it

might further seem that, whereas he regards
which he discovers, we shall

as deleterious that impact of religion

intimate

it

to be a loss that the influence of religion

and culture

is

not relatively greater than

of indicating any strictures

upon our thought

appears to be.

it

we might have upon

Instead

the conclusions of

Professor Radhakrishnan. or of entering upon an examination of

which we ha\e already said or ma\- still
does ultimately diverge from his conclusions, let us

the extent to which that

ha\e

to

sa}'

merely point out
e\"en
i-

that,

while Professor Radhakrishnan's primarv,

though not exclusive, gaze

is

upon Europe, our

America, with Europe as marginal.

jioint

of fixation

]\Ioreover. while he singles

which expovmd
concerned not with these exclusively
but more generally with such liberalistic and humanistic doctrines as
seem most clearly to reflect and most directl}' to afl:ect our present
for consideration those philosophical systems

out

pluralistic theism,

cultural
ligion" as

life.

we

shall be

Furthermore, and more importantp-, the term

're-

used by Professor Radhakrishnan does not designate the

same form

of consciousness or

body of

facts

which we have

in

mind.

Let us then undertake an inspection of the religious consciousness, directing our attention particularly to

tion connected with

its

salient features.

some
\\'hile

lines of considera-

we

shall aspire to

some amount of detail and of
elaboration will be necessary if we are to realize our aim of preparing the way for what we shall wish to emphasize, in the paper which
all

possible brevity in our description,

1

Garbe. The Philosophy of Aiiciciif India,

p.

24.
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is

obviously,

is

Now,

with Indian philosophy.

to follow, in connection

religion,

psychologically an extremely complicated phenomenon.

Anthropologically and sociologically,

it

has appeared in an enormous
we pay regard to its

variety of forms, widely divergent whether
cognitive, conative, or emotional phases, to

and impact upon

cults
its

or

life,

Historically,

devotees.

its

its

myths and creeds,

its

reverberations in the feelings of

has exhibited change and growth which,

it

though perhaps not as rapid as the transformations

Religion, in

of culture, are nevertheless as deep-going.

phases

in other

factual

its

from its normative connotation, therefore represents a domain in which every generalization, like all dehnition.
suffers from a certain degree of arbitrariness, and thus lays itself

as distinguished

open-to possible objection.
Little, therefore, may be predicated of religion if the predication
intended as sweepingly universal. Nevertheless, one may with
some assurance insist that in the main, whether in its more primitive
is

or

its

more advanced forms,

one of

the religious consciousness involves as

features man's awareness that he

its

is

power-

living in a

world, and that he must orient and adjust himself thereto as best
he may. The controlling power or powers, as he indeed with some

measure of clearness

realizes, are but inadequately

understood by

him, or are perhaps even deemed to be incomprehensible. Yet he
is convinced of their existence, and at every given time he believes
that he

knows

so

much

of their character as

which he has been

attitudes to

led,

and

feels constrained, in relation to them.

greater number of

least in the

cases

—

to

Religion, that
is

an experience

individual, as a psychological matter of

objective
reality

realit\',

is its

and

is implied by acts and
which he subsequently

fact,

is

to say

in

—

at

which the

conscious of an

is

of the fact that an essential feature of this

extraordinary power, a power supernormal in

its

degree

and portentous in its bearing upon the well-being of the individual
and his group. Indeed, subject to the reservations always necessary

when speaking

of religion in general, one

may

safely say that

involves man's conscious and practical attitude to the

him

is

ultimate,

and that

is

realit\-

it

that for

peculiarly and mysteriously related to

the events of nature and to man's vital concerns.

Such being the
consciousness

power but

is

case,

concerned

also of value.

the
is

by

reality
it

with

conceived

which
in

the

religious

terms not alone of

This aspect of value, indeed, has of

received increasing recognition.

Whether under

late

the influence of
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and other post-Kantians, or of Hoeffding's

thesis that rehgion

is

fruitful

conservation of vahies,

essentiail}- faith in the

or whether because of vohintaristic psychologies which give to
terests a priority over ideas, recent students of religion

tended to stress

in-

have even

value aspect to the point of one-sitledness.

its

our contention that the object of which the individual

It is

is

conscious in his religious experience possesses for him the attributes

both of power and of value.
the ultimate being;

acquires the traits

it

It is

supremely

real, if

deemed

loftiest at the

indeed

it

is

not

more and more
time eventualK' it becomes

practically significant

is

:

it

;

the indissoluble synthesis of the irrefragably real and the

trul}- ideal.

Kant resolved the basic human questions into three what can I
know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope. These questions
:

are

all

of serious

moment

to the

genuine religious consciousness.

In

most highly developed forms, pronouncedly when its mystical
element comes to the fore, it insists that absolute truth is attainable
(though be it marked in the specific sense only that ultimate
reality is accessible to man), that duty is not an illusion, and that
its

—

—

desire, wdien conscious of

mentally

A

satisfied.

its

deepest requirements,

completely ascendent

may

religious

be fundamvsticism

which fulfills man's supreme cognitive
aims and also his desiderative and volitional life. Difficult paradoxes
and intellectual puzzlements here present themselves. These center
about the fact that actualities, as Baldwin develops in considerable
detail in his Genetic Logic, "are what we discover, whether we desire them or not," whereas desire looms large in the texture of
ideals.
In the teeth of all difficulties, however, religion has tended
stubbornly to resist any suggestion that it relinquish in its object
the aspect either of actuality or of value.
Both power and goodaffirms a type of experience

ness,

it

The
as

it

so

firmly maintains, are essential to

its

religious consciousness, therefore,

commonly has been of

The very contrary

late, in

is

object.

not to be interpreted,

terms of escape from

Religion

reality.

an earnest and a stubborn
It is convinced that anv conception
C[uest for truth and reality.
which reason shows to the untenable must be discarded, however
deeply

it

is

the case.

may have become

is

rooted in emotion and

life.

For,

it

is

staunch in the faith that only the real can completelv and permanently satisfy that which is deepest in us. In matters of creed,
as w^ell as of feeling

and practical concern^

it

voices the determina-

tion expressed in Job's tragically heroic resolve that "though

He
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me, vet

slav

will

The developed

Him."

trust

I

con-

religious

sciousness would seem to acquiesce only in that which most fully,

which

indeed
Its

object

completel}',

one

is

man's

satisfies

believed

to

interpret

recpurements.

deepest

courses

the

of

histor\'

and of nature, to embody whatever man's self-conscious reason
leads him to value and reverence, and to guarantee unalloyed
may,

It

bliss.

to repeat, not

be denied that such a faith sets to

if not completely baffling, commust be confessed that not even a Plato, and no

philosophy tasks of extraordinary,

And

plexity.

it

subsequent philosopher, has as yet resolved with more than partial
success the various antinomies presented by religion.
a perpetual

religion continues as

perfection, reality

Xor

from

and worthful object from the
contrary,

it

power from

ideality.

consent to a severance of

will religion

Nevertheless,

refusal to divorce

lives of

human

declares the possibility of a

its

supremely

individuals.

finite

real

On

the

existence permeated

and such an existence it is disposed to require,
blindness and sinfulness are involved
whenever the finite reserves any remnant of himself in isolation from
To certain religious mystics, indeed, the life of man.
the divine.

bv the divine
its

spirit

;

being that

conviction

experiences

in its apical

certainl\-, if

very pulsations of God.

not throughout, represents the

Nevertheless, there are spiritual require-

ments which impel even the religious mystic to a contrary attitude,
to an advocacy of and a struggle for the jM-eservation of selfhood
and individuality. Here again paradoxes and moral perplexities are

The

engendered.
in

one of

its

intellect is

confronted with the perennial question,

aspects, of the one

demand

tension between the

and the many.

^lorally, there

is

a

for the free determination and exercise

of dutv on the part of volitional agents and the craving for divine

guidance and control,
fullest

— for

individual

The
tions

or. at

any

rate, the

unreserved dedication

must be the

to

a

need

—

if life is

superfinite

to be at its

which for the

all in all.

religious consciousness, thus, holds fast to various aftirma-

which

to

it

are

all

fundamental even though they are not

easil\-

impact upon the philosophic quest, therefore, it
arouses deep discontent with metaphysical systems which adopt the
easy course of singling out and treating as basic certain s|)ecific feareconciled.

In

tures of realitv
with.

It

its

and of disregarding

challenges the thinker to a

arduous reflection;

it

stirs

him

all

that seems incompatible there-

more

catholic view

and

to

more

to persist in the face of all obscurities
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order that his thought

difficulties, in

mav do

justice to

the fullness of the reality which presents itself to the religious devotee in his most serious and most satisfying experience.

we

\\ ith this
to above.

pass to another of the lines of consideration alluded

Religion, as just noted, disallows to philosophy any ready

acquiesence in results achieved through the neglect of central fea-

Thus it prods the philosopher on to perpetual
does also through a further influence to which we
Religion involves a consciousness that the ultimate

tures of experience.

This

etforts.

now

advert.

it

To quote from Rudolf
and Rcligioji, "religion seeks depth in things,
reaches out toward what is concealed, uncomprehended. m\steri(nis.
It is more than humility; it is piety.
And piety is experience of
object transcends present comprehension.
Otto's A\ifuraHsiu

myster}-."

Religion has repeated!}- proclaimed that the wavs of the

Divine are not our ways, as
are

its

we have come

thoughts our thoughts.

— or perhaps, as

For

it.

to

understand them

;

nor

the nature of the Divine

is

—

sometimes alleged, not at all learned
by observation or analysis of any particular reality that has come
within our ken. Hence the Sorbonne was acting in defense of one
not fully

it

is

when
"know" God.

of the convictions of the religious consciousness at the time
it

rejected as heresy the doctrine that

Instructive at this point

it

is

to

it

is

possible to

note that A\'undt"s extensive re-

searches and penetrating psychological analvses as reported in his
\ olkerpsychologie led
is

a

him

to the doctrine that the

god of

religion

with that mysterious creation of the
designated the 'demon.'
The distinguished

synthesis of the hero

which he
American ps^xhologist of religion Leuba has also insisted that
"mysteriousness and avvefulness always belong to gods, and man's
relations with gods will be more or less deeply colored with awe."
Let the Divine receive embodiment in specific imager\- or material
emotions

representation, or

there
that
all

let it

acquire definite formulation in a creed, and

bound shortly to
which was accepted
is

arise a vital religious spirit to declare that

as Divine

is

but an

idol, a

figment of an

too limited experience and of a religious need but imperfectlv

conscious of

its

own

requirements.

reported that Paul, coming in his long missionarv journevs
to Athens, found there among its several temples devoted to the
It is

gods of Greek mythology, one dedicated to the unknown God. The
latter he sought to make known rmto the people.
But even his all
but consummate genius failed.

Of

the Athenians, onlv a ver\- few

;
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seemed convinced; some mocked, and others, though stating that
they would hear him again on these matters, were

left

lumined, and therefore apparently so indifferent, that Paul,

so
in

among them, leaving the
unknown God. \\'e allude to

ing discouragement, departed from

and

their philosophers with the

unil-

seem-

incident only for purposes of illustration.

Is

it

folk
this

not the case that,

whenever any advanced people have found themselves with specifically imaged gods, or with such as were with considerable completeness understood by them, they have become profoundly dissatisfied,
and have felt an irresistible impulse either to reject their deities or
to supplement them with a further god essentially vmknown?
True it is that all religions living for long in the spirits of men,
have affirmed various attributes of their gods as they have come to
know them through one form or another of revelation, or it matters
not how. But no less true is it that in one way or another, and at
some point or another, they have persistently and stoutly declared
that no human thoughts or finite consciousness may express the
nature of the religious object, that the Divine in
as such

is

its

essential nature

qualitatively other than the limited realities accessible to

our comprehension,

is

somehow genuinely transcendent

of finite ex-

and of human apprehension.
It has often been noted that religion has been fed by man's sense
of the mysterious. Here we are concerned merely to suggest that
religion has in turn sustained that by which it has been nourished.
For the life of philosophy, this, as we shall in our concluding paper
Epochs and peoples that
observe, is a fact of no little moment.
osmosis
between
religion and philosophy
nexus
or
preserve a living
istence

possess not only a religion but likewise a philosophy essentially other

be found where the connection is weakened or severed.
most characteristic and lofty forms, then, the religious
consciousness postulates a reality that synthesizes being and value
it insists upon a union of the human and the divine; and it is sensitively alive to the fact of an uncomprehended, if not incomprehensible, presence, and to the lure of the mysterious in nature and
than

is

In

human

to

its

experience.

rent soul;

its

Its

source

is

in the stirrings of a dissatisfied or

emphasis oscillates between the attitude of the

self to

world and the bearing of the world upon the self; its promise is
salvation and realization.
To be sure, the term religion covers a great variety of phenomena. In part the variations are due to the fact that in its
its
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life,

as well as to philos-

ophy, religion has in some cases been primarily active and formative.

and has therefore preserved

its

essential integrity

cases, the conditions are reversed

;

whereas, in other

— numerous cultural elements have

developed in considerable independence of religion and have in the
course of time put their stamp upon the latter. Thus, the religious
outlook of India has pretty

merely

its

traditional

—

much

quality,

preserved

and

its

its

unique

— and

not

essential integrity; that of

present day America, on the other hand,

is

strongly dominated by

the influences of industrialism, of the democratic ideal of society,

and of
is

ethical requirements.

In the former case, religion's function

connected with man's endeavor to transcend the world and his

own

present state of being; in the latter case,

the proper

ophy

)

is

aim of

it

is

widely held that

religion (as indeed only less fully that of philos-

to effect desirable

changes

in the phy>ical

and the

social

environment.
Generalizations, to be sure, are perilous and they

become doubly

when employed in the drawing of contrasts or even of comparisons. Yet, when we consider what is typically Indian in relation to
so

what

is

today generally prevalent

dififerences

relations of philosophy

How

in

America, certain important

emerge, at least in degree of emphasis, as respects the

the

and culture

to religion.

features of the religious

above have reflected themselves

in

consciousness as sketched

the philosophy

of

India

and

have thus led to a divergence of the latter from the spirit of the

contemporary
of our studv.

A\'est.

will

appear

in

some

detail in the

second part

